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I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, Second Amendment objections to firearm regulation
did not present itself.1 Even upon objection, longstanding prohibitions on
who may possess firearms, what type of firearms, and how and where
possession occurs have been consistently upheld.2 Recently, a few circuit
courts have introduced a ‘why’ question to the regulation of firearms. 3
These courts have placed more weight on the negative externalities of
bearing arms than on a law-abiding citizen’s right to self-defense in public.
Several circuit courts have held that the government can refuse to
permit a law-abiding citizen to bear arms in public until the citizen has
established a reason ‘why’ he or she needs a concealed firearm for selfdefense.4 In contrast, other sister circuit courts have held that the
restrictions on bearing arms in public have gone too far when the burden
is placed on law-abiding citizens to demonstrate why they need a firearm
to ward off a specific dangerous person.5 Requiring this ‘why’ veers far
from the longstanding prohibitions on possession in sensitive places and
possession by those who have proven themselves dangerous to society.6
Law-abiding citizens have proven their right to bear arms by their conduct
and these ‘why’ restrictions conflict with their right to be “armed and
ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another
person.”7
Nevertheless, several circuit courts have ignored the
government’s burden to prove whether it has the authority to infringe upon
an individual’s constitutional right to bear arms8 and has placed the burden

1

D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008).
Id. at 626–27.
3 See e.g. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016).
4 Id.; see also Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v.
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012).
5 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012).
6 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings).
7 Id. at 584 (internal quotations omitted).
8 See e.g. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 87–88; Drake, 724 F.3d at 443. (Both courts
assumed the general public had no right to self-defense without a “justifiable need” or
“proper cause” to carry a handgun. Neither court placed a burden on the government to
2

2018]

Judicial Toleration for Bearing Arms in Public

211

on the shoulders of law-abiding citizens to prove they have the right to
defend themselves.9
These circuit courts ignore the implication of the Supreme Court’s
analysis that the constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than
the right to simply have a gun in one’s home.10 In addition, these courts
ignore that the Supreme Court has declared armed self-defense as the
central component to Second Amendment rights.11 In spite of this, these
courts have banned a large swath of law-abiding citizens from bearing
arms in public, while not considering whether they could bear arms openly
in their respective states.12 Although it was established in 1897 that a
prohibition on carrying concealed weapons does not infringe upon Second
Amendment rights, carrying arms was never considered a right that could
be prohibited for the law-abiding.13
Nonetheless, the judiciary in general has justified restricting access
to firearms in order to “promote public safety and eliminate negative
externalities.”14 The objective of the judiciary is to perform a balancing
of individual liberties and negative externalities.15 However, when it
comes to the bearing of arms by the law-abiding, the Second Amendment
“is the very product of an interest balancing by the people” that the court
should not “conduct anew.”16 Therefore, outside of the “longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places,”17 lawabiding citizens do not need a ‘why’ to bear arms because the Constitution
gives them the right to “judicial toleration of the negative externalities”18
of bearing arms in public.
Below, this proposition and the thought process involved are further
discussed. Part I describes the responsive dance the Supreme Court and
Congress have performed since the 18th century, cautiously shuffling
through the issue of bearing arms. Part II further describes how the circuit
courts, as of early 2018, have stepped into that dance and asserted their
own paths toward new restrictions on bearing arms. Part III challenges
prove the general public had no such constitutional right although the cases both were ruled
upon after Heller and McDonald).
9 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88; Drake, 724 F.3d at 431.
10 See Moore, 702 F.3d at 935.
11 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
12 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942.
13 U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).
14 Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
951, 953 n.3 (2011).
15 Id. at 963.
16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
17 Id. at 626–27.
18 Blackman supra note 14, at 956.
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those restrictions through an analysis of burden shifting and interest
balancing. Part IV considers this author’s proposition for the Supreme
Court’s next choreographed move toward judicial toleration. Finally, Part
V concludes with practical implications with or without this movement in
the law.
II. BACKGROUND OF BEARING ARMS
A. 18th & 19th Centuries
On December 15, 1791, Virginia was the last necessary state to ratify
ten of the first twelve proposed amendments, consequently adding the Bill
of Rights to the Constitution.19 The States did not ratify the first two
proposals that aimed at protecting the principles of representation via
reapportionment and controlling the compensation of representatives.20
This inaction framed the Bill of Rights to be solely focused on individual
rights for the first nine amendments and states’ rights for the tenth.21
Therefore, the “collective rights” argument for the Second Amendment
will not be addressed in this article.22 What will be addressed in Part I is
that Congress and the Supreme Court have consistently held, from 1791
to 2018, that the right to bear arms can only be marginally regulated and
not outright prohibited for law-abiding citizens.
Congress ratified the following text of the second amendment in
1791 and the text has never been altered. “A well-regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”23 It was not until 1856 when the
Supreme Court embraced this right in the infamous case, Dredd Scott v.
Sanford.24 There, the court declared the “privileges and immunities of
citizens . . . give them the full liberty . . . to keep and carry arms wherever
they went.”25 Soon after the Civil War, Congress spoke out on the right to
bear arms for the first time since 1789 with the Freedman’s Bureau Act of

19 Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the TwentySeventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 532 (1992).
20 Id. at 530–31.
21 Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 220 (1983).
22 See U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d
222 (1990) (This article does not thoroughly address this issue, but this court declared that
‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment are individuals, not states, which
reinforced the ‘individual rights’ argument on Second Amendment issues.).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
24 See 60 U.S. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1856) (superseded on other grounds (1868)).
25 Id. at 416–17.
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1866.26 The law mirrored the Supreme Court’s findings from ten years
before: “the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security . . . including
the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to, and enjoyed by
all citizens.”27 Although Congress reached the same conclusion as the
Supreme Court, the reasoning for the law could not have been farther
apart. In 1856, the Supreme Court embraced the right to bear arms to keep
non-citizens from obtaining it.28 In 1866, Congress embraced the right to
bear arms because “the threat of this period was not a federal standing
army, but state encroachment on basic civil rights, and the issue focused
on private violence and local lapses in protection rather than federal
tyranny.”29 Law-abiding citizens needed their right to bear arms
unobstructed through governmental regulations and Congress delivered
protection of their right.
Within a decade, the Supreme Court further embraced the right to
bear arms by holding it above the Constitution itself.30 In Cruikshank it
declared, “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in
any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”31 As a side
note, the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1872 boldly placed state civil rights
enforcement out of the hands of the federal government, silently removing
Fourteenth Amendment federal protections for the right to bear arms.32
This dicta pronouncement was overturned by McDonald in 2010.33 In
1886, the Court narrowed the right to exclude military drill-and-paradeunder-arms outside of the control of the government.34 There, the Presser
Court emphasized the difference between the right of the people to
peaceably assemble and a mere assembly of people as a military company
that drills and parades with arms, which is not a right.35 With this
narrowing came a broad stroke of the Supreme Court’s power to deny any
other restriction on the individual’s right to bear arms.36 “[T]he states
26

Sean J. Kealy, The Second Amendment as Interpreted by Congress and the Court, 3
NE. U.L.J. 225, 250 (2011).
27 Id.
28 See Scott, 60 U.S. at 416–17.
29 Kealy, supra note 26, at 251.
30 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
31 Id.
32 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77–79, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872).
33 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 791, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed.
2d 894 (2010) (“We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”)
34 See Presser v. People of State of Ill., 116 U.S. 252, 267, 6 S. Ct. 580, 29 L. Ed. 615
(1886).
35 Id. at 266–67.
36 Id. at 265.
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cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view,
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the
United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security,
and disable the people from performing their duty to the general
government.”37 With the stroke of a pen, the Court informed law-abiding
citizens that the right to parade with arms could only be granted by the
government and its ruling was prohibiting no other use of arms.38 This
was the beginning of ‘how’ one could bear arms.
In 1897, the Supreme Court plunged deep into our country’s English
ancestry and expressed concern that the Bill of Rights could be interpreted
as being a novel expression of new rights without exception.39 Seemingly
off topic, the Robertson Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment was
never intended to apply to the deserting seamen’s contracts within the
conflict.40 In dicta, the Court announced that the Second Amendment also
consisted of certain well-recognized exceptions as the Thirteenth.41 This
unenumerated Second Amendment exception created by the Court was
said to have been passed down from our English ancestors, who prohibited
the carrying of concealed weapons.42 It read, “the right of the people to
keep and bear arms (under article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting
the carrying of concealed weapons.”43 There, the Robertson Court halted
the notion that the Bill of Rights was a blank check with which individual
citizens could cash with full protection of his or her right.44 Other than the
reference to English law, no further explanation for this exception can be
found in Robertson.45 This lack of American precedent and weakness
inherent in dicta pronouncements should make way for a 21st century
Supreme Court to produce a different outcome. Since 1897, the ‘how’ of
bearing arms lost its Second Amendment protections unless born openly,46
but that can change.
37

Id.
Id at 264–65.
39 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. at 281.
40 Id. at 287–88.
41 Id. at 281–82. (As the Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit all contracts that
could be deemed to include involuntary servitude, neither does the Second Amendment
prohibit all gun regulation such as laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons).
42 Id. at 281.
43 Id. at 281–82.
44 Id. at 281. (“The law is perfectly well settled that the first 10 amendments to the
Constitution, commonly known as the ‘Bill of Rights,’ were not intended to lay down any
novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities
which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial,
been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising from the necessities of the
case.”).
45 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 275.
46 Id. at 281.
38
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B. 20th & 21st Centuries
As the roaring twenties were well under way, Congress supported the
Court’s restrictions on concealed weapons with the enactment of the
Mailing Firearms Act (“MFA”) of 1927.47 The MFA “prohibited the
mailing of concealable firearms through the United States Postal
Service.”48 In the 1930s the question evolved from ‘how’ weapons could
be born to ‘what’ weapons could be born.49 Congress introduced the
National Firearms Act (“NFA”) in 1934, which “taxed the manufacture,
sale, and transfer of short-barreled rifles and shotguns, machine guns, and
silencers.”50 Then in 1938, the Federal Firearms Act (“FFA”) “spread a
thin coat of regulation over all firearms and many classes of ammunition
suitable for handguns.”51 The FFA went even further to hint at ‘who’ could
possibly be restricted from bearing arms.52 “Licensees were prohibited
from knowingly shipping a firearm in interstate commerce to some felons,
a fugitive from justice, a person under indictment, or anyone required to
have a license under the law of the seller’s state who did not have a
license.”53 The Supreme Court ended the decade refocusing the law on
‘what’ arms could be born.54 There, the Miller Court held,
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a wellregulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument.55

For the next generation, the Supreme Court and Congress would only
be heard once, respectively, on this topic. Congress began this short
conversation in 1941 with the Property Requisition Act (“PRA”).56
Although the PRA dealt with the federal government requisitioning
private property, Congress used it to clarify that an individual right to bear
arms would not be infringed due to this Act’s enforcement.57 The PRA

47 Patrick Luff, Regulating Firearms Through Litigation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1587
(2014).
48 Id.
49 See U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L. Ed. 1206 (1939).
50 Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY
48, 60 (2008).
51 Franklin Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 133, 140 (1975).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Miller, 307 U.S. 174.
55 Id. at 178.
56 Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by
A Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597
(1995).
57 Id. at 599.
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read, “Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed—(1) to authorize
the requisitioning or require the registration of any firearms possessed by
any individual . . . [or](2) to impair or infringe in any manner the right of
any individual to keep and bear arms.”58 The Supreme Court only
glimpsed at this topic when it dealt with cases challenging the FFA in
1943.59 There, the Tot Court held that a provision of the FFA which would
prohibit the possession of firearms by those convicted of crimes of
violence was unreasonable if the prohibition was due to the firearms
traveling through interstate commerce.60 Tot rejected the presumption
that, “mere possession tends strongly to indicate that acquisition must have
been in an interstate transaction.”61 With Tot, Congress was informed that
it had stretched its Commerce Clause powers too far.62 With that, the
responsive dance between the Supreme Court and Congress ended and did
not resume for the next twenty-five years.63
The counter-culture movement of the 1960s reignited the Supreme
Court and Congress’ interest in protecting individual rights.64 The Court
acted first in 1966.65 There, the Katzenbach Court declared that Congress’
power granted by the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment “is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment; [section five] grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”66 Although the Court’s
move was not specifically targeted at the right to bear arms, when
Congress considered passing gun control laws just two years later,67 it
became the main issue. The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) reads,
It is not the purpose of this title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal
Restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the
acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of
hunting, trap shooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other
lawful activity, and that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate
the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens.68

Additionally, the GCA restricted the right for “minors, convicted
felons, and persons who had been adjudicated as mental defectives or

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
See Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519 (1943).
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
Zimring, supra note, 51.
Id. at 148.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 16 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1966).
Id. at 651.
Kealy, supra note 26, at 282.
18 U.S.C. 101, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
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committed to mental institutions.”69 The 1960s ended with the federal
government making it clear ‘who’ ‘law-abiding citizens’ were and how
citizenship alone earned a citizen’s right to bear arms without government
discouragement.
The 1970s and 1980s kept with this mantra and emphasized that the
right to bear arms was protected for the ‘law-abiding’. In 1972, an officer
seized a gun from the waistband of a suspect.70 The officer “asked no
questions; he made no investigation; he simply searched.”71 Critics at the
time considered whether both the Second and Fourth Amendments were
being watered down.72 There, the Williams Court held that if a police
officer “has reason to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous, he
may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to [his] protective
purpose.”73 Williams allowed a police officer’s probable cause deduction
that a suspect is not a ‘law-abiding’ citizen to temporarily restrict the
suspect’s Second Amendment rights.74 Again, only if one is ‘law-abiding’
are Second Amendment protections safeguarded.
Soon thereafter, the Court embraced the GCA in two consecutive
cases. First in 1976, the Barrett Court declared, “[the] very structure of
the Gun Control Act demonstrates that Congress . . . sought broadly to
keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially
irresponsible and dangerous. These persons are comprehensively barred
by the Act from acquiring firearms by any means.”75 Then in 1980, the
Lewis Court declared, “Congress clearly intended that the defendant clear
his status [of felon] before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress’
purpose, broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress
classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.”76
Although the Supreme Court stamped the GCA with its approval
with these rulings, Congress implemented the Firearms Owners’
Protection Act of 1986 (“FOPA”).77 FOPA was the congressional
culminating statement that began in 1866, continued from 194178 to 1968,

69

Zimring, supra note 51, at 149 (citing Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 925(d)(3)
(1970)).
70 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972).
71 Id. at 155.
72 Id. at 151.
73 Id. at 146 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968)).
74 Barrett v. U.S., 423 U.S. 212, 96 S. Ct. 498, 46 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976).
75 Id. at 218.
76 Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55, 64–65, 100 S. Ct. 915, 63 L. Ed. 2d 198 (1980).
77 Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, P.L. 99-308. 100 Stat. 449 (May 19, 1986).
78 Halbrook, supra note 56, at 636 (citing U. S. v. Breier, 827 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Noonan, J., dissenting)).
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and was best summarized in the 1985 Senate Judiciary Committee.79
There, the history, concept, and wording of the Second Amendment
indicated that it was “an individual right of a private citizen to own and
carry firearms in a peaceful manner.”80 The 1980s ended with a familiar
mantra, the right to bear arms was protected for the ‘law-abiding’ or
peaceful private citizen.
The 1990s found the Supreme Court and Congress in less of a dance
with one another and more of a friendly sparring match on the right to bear
arms issue. The first scuffle began after Congress created the Gun Free
School Zones Act (“GFSZA”) of 1990.81 GFSZA read in part, “It shall be
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved
in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.”82 The Supreme Court responded to the GFSZA with United States
v. Lopez in 1995.83 Lopez confronted Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority again when Congress attempted to qualify this criminal statute
as an issue within “commerce.”84
This move was explained
foundationally: “In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence, a double security arises to the
rights of the people.”85 The right to bear arms was protected by the
Founders’ insight into the separation of powers and ‘the people’ had not
surrendered that right to Congress by way of the Commerce Clause.86
The next scuffle of the 1990s occurred after Congress passed the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Law”) of 1993.87 The
Brady Law had two components: background checks for gun purchasers
that were to be provided by state law enforcement and a waiting-period
gun dealers had to honor before consummating the sales.88 The waitingperiod issue never came before the court.89 Yet, in Printz v. United States,
the Supreme Court addressed the background check issue with the same
separation of powers concerns addressed in Tot and Lopez.90 The Printz
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Kealy, supra note 26, at 283.
Id.
18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2).
Id.
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 576.
Id.
See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
Id. at 903.
Id. at 935.
Id.
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Court found that when the federal government conscripted state actors to
enforce the Brady Act,91 it undermined the independent authority of the
state and risked the degradation of the safeguards on individual liberty.92
The Acts of the 1990s were the first hints that Congress was starting to
weigh the negative externalities of bearing arms whereas the Supreme
Court simply refused to participate in such a balancing act.
It was not until 2008 that the Supreme Court forcefully documented
its unwillingness to balance negative externalities of bearing arms with the
enumerated constitutional right.93 In Heller, the District of Columbia
banned handgun possession in the home. 94 The Supreme Court declared,
the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment
right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’
that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose.
The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense
of self, family, and property is most acute.95

The Court concluded by declaring that prohibiting a law-abiding
citizen from protecting his or her home and family by bearing arms failed
constitutional muster.96
Although the Supreme Court has challenged congressional
movement on the Second Amendment, Congress has never challenged the
Supreme Court on the issue. As of 2018, Congress has not challenged the
Heller case. To the contrary, Congress made a statement on bearing arms
within the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act
of 2009 (“CARD”).97 As odd as that seems, this Act has a provision
protecting the right to bear loaded arms in national parks.98 Thus,
Congress’s last words on the subject fully embrace the Second
Amendment’s core that, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”99
Not long after Heller, the Supreme Court followed up its ruling by
hearing an Illinois case that claimed the Heller ruling did not apply to the
States.100 As mentioned earlier, in the 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases, the
Supreme Court placed State civil rights enforcement out of the hands of
the federal government using the Privileges and Immunities Clause as its

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id. at 976–77. (Breyer, J., Stevens, J., dissenting).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id. at 628–29.
15 U.S.C. § 1601.
54 U.S.C. § 104906 (Protection of right of individuals to bear arms).
Id.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 743.
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tool.101 In 2010, the McDonald Court sidestepped the Slaughterhouse
Cases and declared that “[C]ruikshank, Presser, and Miller do not
preclude us from considering whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right binding on
the States.”102 McDonald further articulated that,
[u]nder our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental . . . . then,
unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the
States and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise
solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.103

With these words, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Second
Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people”
that must not be conducted anew.104
The most recent case105 heard by the Supreme Court on the topic of
bearing arms was Caetano v. Massachusetts in March of 2016.106 There,
a woman defended herself with a stun gun and was arrested, tried, and
convicted of possession of that stun gun.107 What makes this case more
interesting than most is that the lower court used the losing Heller
arguments and then completely ignored the Heller ruling.108 After
dismissing all the arguments, the Caetano court provided the pertinent
issue itself, “[w]hether stun guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes today.”109 This holding foreshadowed the
Supreme Court’s future test for bearing arms going forward; whichever
test is chosen, it will include the necessity of law-abiding citizens
performing acts for lawful purposes.110 As the last words of the opinion
attest, negative externalities balancing with enumerated constitutional
rights is a fundamentally flawed method of protecting law-abiding
citizens.111 “If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect [Ms.]
Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the mercy of state

101

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77–79. [To be completely honest, I’m not sure
if “Slaughter-House Cases gets italicized here, so I’m going to ask my editor!]
102 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758.
103 Id. at 784–85.
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
105 See U.S. v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014) (Although not a Second
Amendment case, Castleman’s conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
was found by the Supreme Court to be enough to show that he was not a law-abiding citizen
and, thus, forbid him from possessing firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).).
106 See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
107 Id. at 1029.
108 Id. at 1027–32.
109 Id. at 1032.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1033.
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authorities who may be more concerned about disarming the people than
about keeping them safe.”112
C. Yesterday and Today
Part I of this article demonstrated the dance between the Supreme
Court and Congress and in what manner those movements framed the who,
what, where, and how of bearing arms. The ‘why,’ the necessity of arming
for the bearer, is obviously missing. Even with longstanding prohibitions,
which make certain activities outside the protection of the Second
Amendment, Supreme Court decisions and congressional legislation
focusing on the ‘why’ do not exist.
Part II will explore the sister circuits’ heated argument about the
‘why’ which has forced the issue of concealed carry to rise dramatically
to the surface. The argument pits the circuits against each other and
sometimes provokes panels to disagree within a circuit itself. Concealed
carry is at the heart because citizens are being denied permits to carry
weapons outside the home when open carry is not an option. However,
open carry is not being adjudicated, only concealed. This is the reason the
Supreme Court has denied hearing these cases. Until a case comes to the
Court that takes on both manners of carrying weapons, certiorari will
continue to be denied.
In the meantime, certain circuit courts are holding on to Robertson
from 1897 with both hands. As you may recall, the Robertson court
discussed in dicta that Second Amendment protections were not available
for concealed carry.113 However, Robertson is without precedent since its
ruling is based on English law.114 To demonstrate this lack of precedence
issue, the Supreme Court held that constitutional issues,
[m]ust be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context
of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English
parliamentary system. We should bear in mind that the English system differs
from ours in that their Parliament is the supreme authority, not a coordinate
branch.115

Therefore, not only has the history of Supreme Court decisions and
Congressional acts not supported adding a ‘why’ to the regulation of
bearing arms, the one supposedly precedential case that supports
prohibiting concealed carry has no legal foundation within the United
States. Without even looking at the circuit courts, one would wonder how
concealed carry for law-abiding citizens could be constructively banned.

112
113
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Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1033.
Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82.
Id.
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III. CIRCUIT COURT DETOUR INTO THE ‘WHY’ OF BEARING
ARMS
A. All Conflicting Circuits Agree, There is a Right to Bear Arms
Outside the Home
In the last decade, right to bear arms arguments in the circuit courts
have lost focus on militia dependence and collective rights largely due to
Heller and McDonald.116 These landmark Supreme Court cases created
new arguments for the judicially dissimilar sister circuit courts to
distinguish themselves and further dilute the arguments made.117 Today,
the hot topic among the circuit courts is whether the law-abiding have a
constitutionally protected right to bear arms in public.118 Even with this
contentious topic, all circuit courts that have ruled on this issue agree,
“[t]he Second Amendment right to bear arms extends outside the home or
have assumed that the right exists.”119 This article will focus on circuit
decisions from each side of the debate: the Second, Third, Fourth, and
Ninth circuits versus the Fourth, Seventh and District of Columbia circuits.
Initially, the Second Circuit declared, “[t]he Amendment must have
some application in the very different context of the public possession of
firearms.”120 The Third Circuit recognized “that the Second Amendment’s
individual right to bear arms may have some application beyond the
home.”121 The Fourth Circuit assumed, “[t]he Heller right exists outside
the home . . . .”122 The Seventh Circuit explained, “To confine the right to
be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right
of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.”123 The Ninth Circuit
determined that, “pursuant to Heller and McDonald, an individual’s right
to self-defense extends outside the home and includes a right to bear arms
in public in some manner.”124 Finally, the D.C. Circuit concluded
“(longstanding exceptions aside) carrying beyond the home, even in
populated areas, even without special need, falls within the Amendment’s
coverage, indeed within its core.”125 As shown, the sister circuits agree that
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See Joseph B. Adams, Dispensing with the Second Amendment, 12 TRINITY L. REV.
75, 113 (2004).
117 David O’Boyle, The Right to Bear Arms, 30 WASH. LAW. 25, 31 (October 2015).
118 Id. at 28.
119 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 947.
120 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88.
121 Drake, 724 F.3d at 431.
122 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
123 Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
124 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 948.
125 Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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the right to bear arms in public cannot be prohibited but they disagree on
what extent it can be regulated.
B. Circuit Courts Sidestepping the Supreme Court
The circuit splitting argument against concealed-carry permits
begins with ‘why’ law-abiding citizens need to possess a firearm in public.
The Second Circuit was the first to enter this side of the ‘bearing arms in
public’ debate in 2012 when it embraced a longstanding principle first
established in New York in 1913.126 In 1913, the “proper cause”
requirement for obtaining a concealed weapons license for bearing arms
in public was,
. . . it shall be lawful for any magistrate, upon proof before him that the
person applying therefor is of good moral character, and that proper cause
exists for the issuance thereof, to issue to such person a license to have and
carry concealed a pistol or revolver without regard to employment or place of
possessing such weapon.127

The modern version of this law pinpoints ‘proper cause’ as, “a
special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general
community or of persons engaged in the same profession.”128 This
limiting standard allowed government authority to provide concealed
weapon licenses only to those with a “special need for self-protection.”129
The 1913 New York law was supported by the 1897 Supreme Court
Robertson dicta, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”130
In Kachalsky, the court acknowledged that Heller did not use a
means-end scrutiny test when it held that “the ‘core’ protection of the
Second Amendment is the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home.”131 Yet, the Kachalsky court ruled
that defense outside the home needs to meet an intermediate scrutiny test
where “the fit between the challenged regulation need only be substantial,
not perfect.”132 In order to withstand strict scrutiny, “[t]he law must
advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means
available.”133 To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a law “must be
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Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92.
1913 N.Y. Laws 608, at 1629.
128 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92. (citing Klenosky v. N.Y City Police Dep’t, 75 A.D.2d
793, 793, 428 N.Y.S.2d
256 (1st Dep’t 1980).
129 Id.
130 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82.
131 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-635).
132 Id. at 97.
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substantially related to an important governmental objective.”134 To
withstand minimum scrutiny, “a statutory classification must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”135
The Second Circuit choosing a standard of scrutiny was the first
sidestep away from the specific Heller ruling. For Heller declined to
determine what level of scrutiny should be used for bearing arms outside
the home.136 In fact, the Heller test consisted of a two-part approach
purposely omitting a level of scrutiny distinction.137 The first part of the
Heller test determined whether the individual right to bear arms for selfdefense was a protected Second Amendment activity.138 In the second
part, the Court weighed the effect of the challenged gun laws on that
activity to determine the extent of the burden.139 Nevertheless, Kachalsky
circumvented the Heller analysis.
Next, the Third Circuit entered this side of the ‘bearing arms in
public’ debate in 2013.140 Like the Second Circuit, it chose not to use the
Heller test, but instead, used its own 2010 two-part test.141 The Third
Circuit asked
whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee . . . If it
does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law
under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster
under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.142
The challenged law here came from a 1924 New Jersey law, which
“directed that no persons (other than those specifically exempted such as
police officers and the like) shall carry [concealed] handguns except
pursuant to permits issuable only on a showing of ‘need.’”143 In 2013, the
Drake court embraced this law as its “longstanding,” “presumptively
lawful” exception to the Second Amendment guarantee.144 Thus, allowing
it to move onto its second test, that of evaluating the law under some form
of means-end scrutiny.145
Drake began this inquiry by sidestepping the Supreme Court and
declaring that strict scrutiny should only be used when the challenged law
134

Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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136 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 628.
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138 Id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–626.
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burdens “the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home.”146 For selfdefense outside of the home, the Third Circuit went directly to an
intermediate scrutiny test and asked, “whether there is a ‘reasonable fit’
between this interest in safety and the means chosen by New Jersey to
achieve it: the Handgun Permit Law and its ‘justifiable need’ standard.”147
Unlike the intermediate standard embraced by the Supreme Court, where
a law must be “substantially related” to an important governmental
objective the Drake court skirted around the Supreme Court and embraced
an arguably lower standard of “a reasonable fit” with legislative intent.148
Thus, not only did the Third Circuit sidestep the Supreme Court by
ignoring the Heller test, but it also adjusted the test for intermediate
scrutiny.149
Also in 2013, the Fourth Circuit repeated a two-part inquiry, similar
to that relied upon by the Third Circuit, in order to evaluate the good-andsubstantial-reason requirement of the Maryland law being challenged.150
There, the Woollard court held that “public safety interests often outweigh
individual interests in self-defense.”151 Woollard, in full agreement with
Drake and Kachalsky, held that the Second Amendment right of the party
applying for a concealed-carry permit was burdened by the good-andsubstantial-reason requirement, but that burden was constitutionally
permissible.152 This is but another consistent sidestep of the Supreme
Court by the circuit courts.
Finally in 2016, the Ninth Circuit disregarded the Heller two-part
inquiry to fully embrace the Supreme Court’s 1897 holding in
Robertson.153 The Peruta court established that Robertson and the history
surrounding it were all that were necessary to declare that the Second
Amendment does not protect the right of a member of the general public
to carry concealed firearms in public.154 Peruta also brought to the surface
the issue of open-carry.155 While addressing the dissent, Peruta
acknowledged the dissent’s argument that combining California’s ban on
open-carry and its “good cause” restrictions on concealed carry may
violate the Second Amendment, “tantamount to complete bans on the
Second Amendment right to bear arms outside the home for self146
147
148
149
150
151
152
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defense.”156 Nevertheless, since an open-carry argument was not before
the Peruta court, the notion of a probable complete ban was not
addressed.157
Again, Heller is ignored by a circuit court and, as with all the
petitioning cases above, the Court denied certiorari for Peruta.158 In his
dissent of the denial, Justice Thomas stated that there is a “distressing
trend” in the court that treats the Second Amendment as a “disfavored
right” compared to the First and Fourth.159 This author suggests, as stated
previously, the right case has not yet come before the Supreme Court that
would allow it to take on open- and concealed-carry as a whole.
When evaluating these circuit court decisions, the argument
requiring law-abiding citizens to provide ‘why’ they need to possess a
firearm in public to earn the right to bear concealed firearms, condenses
down to following nineteenth-century Supreme Court dicta or passing a
test that balances individual rights with public safety. In contrast, sister
circuits refuse to enter this “vast terra incognita” which the Supreme Court
has chosen not to explore.160
C. Circuit Courts Refusing to Enter Terra Incognita
The Fourth Circuit reappears on the opposite side of the ‘bearing
arms in public’ debate. Before the Fourth Circuit chose to require a reason
‘why’ law-abiding citizens needed to carry a concealed weapon in
Woollard, it ruled in Masciandaro that it would follow Heller and leave
largely intact the right to “possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.”161 The Masciandaro and Woollard courts did not share a
single member of their judicial panels.162 Not surprisingly, while the
Woollard court focused on the ‘why’, the Masciandaro court remained
with the Supreme Court’s focus of ‘where’ law-abiding citizens are
permitted to bear arms.163 Even in following the Supreme Court, the
Masciandaro court struggled with the obscure nature of this “terra
incognita.”164 Terra incognita has not been defined by the Supreme Court,
but lower courts have described terra incognita as a place “where gossip
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and guesswork abound”165 and as “blank areas which have no discernable
details.”166 While Masciandaro wrestled with this lack of clarity, it held
that “self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be.”167
The Seventh Circuit followed this course just months later with a similar
but expanded argument.168
In 2012, Moore began its analysis by boldly stating, “[a] right to bear
arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”169 The
Moore court reiterated that both Heller and McDonald were just about
self-defense, and that a person is much more likely to need to be armed in
a rough neighborhood rather than to have a loaded weapon under his or
her mattress.170 The court evaluated multiple studies and their inconsistent
conclusions led the court to find that “[i]f the mere possibility that
allowing guns to be carried in public would increase the crime or death
rates,” Heller would have been decided differently.171 To build on Heller’s
longstanding prohibitions of “gun ownership by children, felons, illegal
aliens, lunatics, and in sensitive places,” the Moore court pointed to “a
proper balance between the interest in self-defense and the dangers created
by carrying guns in public is to limit the right to carry a gun to responsible
persons.”172 Undoubtedly, the Moore decision is the inverse of the
Kachalsky decision.173 In Moore, laws prevent dangerous people from
having handguns whereas in Kachalsky laws prevent law-abiding citizens
from having handguns without a justified need.174 Moore declares that if
there is to be a balancing test, even if Heller says it is improper to make
one,175 then the test should consist of measuring how public safety is
balanced by responsible persons bearing arms in public.176
In 2017, the District of Columbia Circuit Court became the last
circuit court to touch on the ‘bearing arms in public’ debate and zealously
followed Heller.177 The Wrenn court held that Heller revealed “the Second
Amendment erects some absolute barriers that no gun law may breach.”178
165 Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Labs., Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194
(1st Cir. 1987).
166 Cont’l Steel Corp. v. U.S., 614 F. Supp. 548, 554 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985), vacated in
part sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. U.S., 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
167 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475.
168 Moore, 702 F.3d 933.
169 Id. at 936.
170 Id. at 937.
171 Id. at 939.
172 Id. at 940.
173 Id. at 941; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97.
174 Moore, 702 F.3d at 941; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97.
175 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
176 See Moore, 638 F.3d at 940.
177 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 650.
178 Id. at 664.
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The gun law in question was a D.C. Code provision, which limited
“licenses for the concealed carry of handguns to those showing a good
reason to fear injury to [their] person or property or any other proper
reason for carrying a pistol.”179 Wrenn discussed sister circuit rulings
where “the circuits settling on a level of scrutiny to apply to good-reason
laws explicitly declined to use Heller’s historical method to determine
how rigorously the Amendment applies beyond the home.”180 In line with
that discussion, the Wrenn court did not settle on a level of scrutiny
because D.C.’s ‘good reason’ law was “analogous to the ‘total ban’ that
the Supreme Court struck down in Heller without pausing to weigh its
benefits.”181
The Wrenn court viewed the good-reason law as leaving “each D.C.
resident some remote chance of one day carrying in self-defense.”182 The
court emphasized the notion that D.C. residents’ Second Amendment
rights were being infringed by stressing, “[t]he Second Amendment
doesn’t secure a right to have some chance at self-defense.”183 This
amounted to a ban on carrying weapons in public, forcing the court to
conclude “that (longstanding exceptions aside) carrying beyond the home,
even in populated areas, even without special need, falls within the
Amendment’s coverage, indeed within its core.”184 Thus, allowing the
D.C. circuit to have the last word in the ongoing debate.
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPANDING TO THE ‘WHY’
A. Shifting the Burden to the Law-Abiding
There are two necessary burdens of proof involved with the right to
bear arms, that of the individual and that of the government. The first is
an individual’s burden to prove whether he or she falls in the category of
one of the types of people who have been historically prohibited from
bearing arms, such as youth, felons, and the mentally ill.185 Once an
individual proves he or she is a responsible (mature in age with acceptable
mental health), law-abiding (non-felonious) citizen,186 further questions
must be answered about what firearm was to be borne, where the firearm
was to be borne, and how the firearm was to be borne.187 The courts
179
180
181
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183
184
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created these questions over time, and these questions make up the
“longstanding prohibitions” to bearing arms formed by the courts that take
away Second Amendment protection.188
The individual’s burden to be ‘law-abiding’ is interlinked with the
“foundation of the administration of our criminal law” that one has the
“presumption of innocence” without obvious proof that one is not lawabiding. 189 The Supreme Court consistently holds the fundamental
concept of the presumption of innocence and the equally fundamental
principle that the government bears the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.190 This solid foundation supports the implication that
once innocent, no further burden remains on the law-abiding citizen. Once
an individual is removed from the list of people who have been historically
prohibited from bearing arms, he or she is free to bear arms within the
aforementioned limitations of what, where, and how.191
Second, the government retains the burden to prove whether it has
the authority to infringe upon an individual’s constitutional right to bear
arms.192 At a very basic level, the Second Amendment declares that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed by
Congress.193 Also in its basic form, the Fourteenth Amendment declares
that no state194 shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of
law.195 Both of these amendments place strict limits on the government,
not the individual.196 In Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, there
exists an additional limitation.197 There, as emphasized by the Supreme
Court in Katzenbach, “Congress’[s] power under §5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; §5 grants Congress
no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”198 These
amendments imply that the burden remains solely on the government to
prove it has the authority to infringe upon a law-abiding citizen’s right to
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bear arms.199 In general, this burden can be lessened by way of a meansend scrutiny test.200
A means-end scrutiny test does not apply when the challenged law
fits within Second Amendment guarantees due to the Supreme Court
“declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second
Amendment restrictions.”201 For example, the circuit courts dutifully
follow Heller’s ruling that challenged laws which impose a burden on
conduct falling within the scope of Second Amendment guarantees are
unconstitutional.202 A burden cannot fall on the individual for conduct
protected by the Second Amendment; therefore, the burden lies squarely
with the government.203 However, conduct deemed to be not protected by
Second Amendment guarantees, as described in Part II, have left room for
lower courts to introduce means-end scrutiny tests on challenged laws.204
As of now, burdens are being shifted in the lower courts by using the
intermediate scrutiny test where a law “must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective.”205
Whether it is Kachalsky’s “proper cause,”206 Drake’s “showing of
need,”207 or Woollard’s “good and substantial reason” for why an
individual should be permitted to exercise his or her rights,208 they all shift
the burden. For example, in Kachalsky, the plaintiffs were denied a fullcarry concealed-handgun license by one of the defendant licensing officers
for failing to establish “proper cause”—a special need for selfprotection.209 There, instead of the government carrying the burden of
proving that an individual constitutes a threat before taking away a
fundamental right, the individual maintains the burden to prove that he or
she is being threatened in order to exercise a fundamental right.210 The
fundamental right here, mirrors Heller’s “inherent right of selfdefense.”211 This burden shift created by the lower courts gives greater
weight to public safety than self-defense.212 Since the Supreme Court
“elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
199
200
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citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,”213 this burden cannot
be shifted in the home. Shifting the burden from the government to the
individual outside the home has not been ruled upon by the Supreme
Court, but the Court made it known that the inherent right of self-defense
does not end at one’s front door.214
B. Interest Balancing not to be Redone Anew
To settle this ‘bearing arms outside the home’ issue, an evaluation of
interest balancing for bearing arms in public must be done. Remember, the
Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the
people” that the court should not “conduct for [the people] anew.”215 This
phrase relates back to the consideration that “the people” of this country
gave at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.216 Heller provided
a clear illustration of lawful self-defense.
[T]he laws . . . punished the discharge (or loading) of guns with a small fine
and forfeiture of the weapon (or in a few cases a very brief stay in the local
jail), not with significant criminal penalties. They are akin to modern
penalties for minor public-safety infractions like speeding or jaywalking. And
although such public-safety laws may not contain exceptions for self-defense,
it is inconceivable that the threat of a jaywalking ticket would deter someone
from disregarding a “Do Not Walk” sign in order to flee an attacker, or that
the government would enforce those laws under such circumstances.
Likewise, we do not think that a law imposing a 5–shilling fine and forfeiture
of the gun would have prevented a person in the founding era from using a
gun to protect himself or his family from violence, or that if he did so the law
would be enforced against him.217

At the time of ratification, whether an individual needed to defend
him or herself inside the home or out on the street, a law would not be
enforced against him or her for lawful self-defense.218
As a current example, the Supreme Court declared that it “would not
apply an ‘interest-balancing’ approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neoNazi march through Skokie.”219 The reference draws a picture of an
extremely dangerous activity performed by law-abiding, responsible
people in which the government would not interfere.220 In this example,
First Amendment rights are being exercised.221 Using the Moore ruling
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in the Seventh Circuit, the court considered a similar example that dealt
with the Second Amendment.222
Twenty-first century Illinois has no hostile Indians. But a Chicagoan is a good
deal more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than
in his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower. A woman who is being
stalked or has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-husband is more
vulnerable to being attacked while walking to or from her home than when
inside. She has a stronger self-defense claim to be allowed to carry a gun in
public than the resident of a fancy apartment building (complete with
doorman) has a claim to sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress. But
Illinois wants to deny the former claim, while compelled by McDonald to
honor the latter. That creates an arbitrary difference. To confine the right to
be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of
self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.223

With Judge Posner’s example above, it is apparent that he predicted
the direction of the sister circuits.224 After Judge Posner authored the
Moore opinion in 2012, the sister circuits followed by creating the very
protective-order type restrictions that he presented in Moore.225
Nevertheless, his point is clear, it would be an arbitrary decision to restrict
one type of self-defense and not another.226 Therefore, an interestbalancing approach that weighs public safety against self-defense of a
responsible, law-abiding individual has already been done and should not
be done “anew.”227
V. JUDICIAL TOLERATION OF THE NEGATIVE
EXTERNALITIES
This article has established that public safety cannot undermine the
inherent right of self-defense, which responsible and law-abiding
individuals can exercise. However, plenty of negative externalities affect
the right to bear arms that beg the question of whether all law-abiding
citizens should bear arms. An incident involving police officers in New
York who shot and killed a gunman on the street presents an instructive
example of this question.228 During this confrontation, the police officers
mistakenly shot nine bystanders.229 Although the officers were trained
how to shoot, when to shoot, and when not to shoot, this horrible event
222

See Moore, 702 F.3d at 933.
Id. at 937.
224 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882; Drake, 724 F.3d at 449; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97;
Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
225 Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
226 Id.
227 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
228 Danielle Weatherby, Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers in the War Against
School Violence and the Government-Created Risk Doctrine, 48 CONN. L. REV. 119, 142
(2015).
229 Id.
223

2018]

Judicial Toleration for Bearing Arms in Public

233

still occurred.230 Mistakes will be made by law-abiding citizens and that
actuality does not diminish the fact that the Second Amendment right to
bear arms does not depend on “casualty counts.”231
Looking at the bigger picture, there are positive as well as negative
externalities for bearing arms.232 The former focuses on “arms as a
mechanism of self-defense that can ensure the safety of the gun-carrying
individual”; the latter focuses on the “benefits to society as a whole.”233
The positive externalities of public and private deterrence of wrong doing
are arguably not outweighed by the negative ones.234 The negative
externalities of bearing arms in public include individuals fearing “being
mistaken for criminals and shot, or caught in a cross-fire between people
asserting a right to bear arms for self-defense.”235 Even within such a
harsh reality, the Supreme Court has choreographed its legal moves away
from these named negative-externalities.236 The Court declared that when
you “[d]isarm a community . . . you rob them of the means of defending
life. Take away their weapons of defense and you take away the
inalienable right of defending liberty.”237 This is a constitutional view; a
broader view that demands the judicial toleration of the negative
externalities of bearing arms in public.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The journey between ratification and incorporation took over twohundred years, but the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms for
responsible, law-abiding individuals is now fully enforceable against state
and federal governments. During those two-hundred-plus years, the
Supreme Court and Congress consistently found that the right to bear arms
was an individual right with few exceptions. The questionable exceptions
focused on in this article are found in Robertson’s dicta and the circuit
courts. Robertson states that a prohibition on carrying concealed weapons
does not infringe Second Amendment rights. This dicta places concealedcarry outside the guarantees of the Second Amendment. As the Robertson
case has shown to be without precedent and its dicta being a remnant from
English law, the longstanding placement of concealed-carry as outside
constitutional protections should be eliminated.
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The Heller and McDonald courts lend plenty of support to this
proposition. Both courts find that constitutional protections are for lawabiding citizens performing lawful acts. The Heller court declared that the
very enumeration of the right to bear arms removes from the branches of
government the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right
is really worth insisting upon for the law-abiding.238 For both Heller and
McDonald, responsible, law-abiding citizens have an inherent right to selfdefense that is protected by the Second Amendment.239 Nevertheless, a
handful of circuit courts are bringing forth the notion that the law-abiding
must justify exactly ‘why’ they need to conceal carry.240 If looked upon
with a First Amendment lens, these courts would be acknowledging that a
citizen has freedom of speech but require that citizen to petition the
government with a documented need to speak or it would be forbidden.
As absurd as that sounds, circuit courts have made a similar argument for
the Second Amendment since 2012.
These courts lean on the negative externalities of bearing arms to
further their position. However, neither Heller nor McDonald put much, if
any weight to the inconsistent studies that have neither confirmed nor
denied if the negative externalities outweigh the positive externalities.
With this, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a means-end scrutiny
test is not appropriate for self-defense issues. The Court concluded that
the right to bear arms by responsible citizens balances out the dangers
created by carrying guns in public.241 In 2016, the Court followed up that
conclusion with a warning, “[t]he lower court’s ill treatment of Heller
cannot stand.”242 As of 2018, the Supreme Court has not acted on that
warning or ruled specifically for reconstituting Second Amendment
protections for the concealed bearing of arms in public. Nevertheless, the
Court’s holdings throughout its history and its dicta in the past onehundred plus years lead this author to believe that open-carry and
concealed-carry will be held together as constitutionally protected under
Second Amendment guarantees for responsible, law-abiding citizens in
the near future.
Regardless of that prediction, today’s implications of requiring the
law-abiding to have a special need for self-protection are many. First, in
requiring the intent of the law-abiding before they are permitted to exercise
constitutional rights is a slippery slope that slides into having no rights at
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all. Second, the government being permitted to evaluate rights requests
based on a balancing of that right with need for public safety, is exactly
what it sounds like, a request to a government to exercise rights instead of
a right in which a government is limited in its ability to infringe rights.
Whether the burden of proof shifts from the government to the
individual or a balancing test is being performed, Second Amendment
rights continue to be infringed. Therefore, the obvious next move for the
Supreme Court is to return concealed-carry back under the protection of
the Second Amendment. This move will conclude the circuit courts’
venture into the terra incognita in which the law-abiding were forced to
give a reason for ‘why’ they needed to defend themselves. This future
Supreme Court ruling would conclusively declare that no balancing test
will be used when deciding whether law-abiding citizens can endeavor
into lawful activity. Then, judicial toleration of the negative externalities
of bearing arms in public will bear constitutional fruit.

